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Abstract 
The Oil Major approval of tanker vessels is a highly complex legal issue, which entails various 
legal uncertainties within the process, both for the shipowners and charterers. The legal 
relationship between the shipowner and charterer is regulated by a charter-party, which will 
determine the legal implications of the approval subject to an Oil Major or Vetting clause that the 
parties have incorporated in the charter-party. Author aims to provide guidance for the shipping 
industry with regard to the complex and uncertain issues entailed in the approval processes. 
Further, to clarify the legal relationships and consequences arising out of charter-parties, with 
regard to such Oil Major clauses, and to ascertain how the international communities’ measures 
towards environmental pollution have significantly changed the practice of Oil Major approvals. 
The author begins the work with clarifying the term ‘Oil Major’ itself, subject to English 
Admiralty Court judgments, which is an essential part of the analysis and provides a practical 
insight into the consequences of dispute resolution. These analyses further provide practical 
advice that would be useful for both shipowners and charterers alike, where, the author has 
provided clarification to the various complexities involved in the Oil Major approval or so called 
vetting process. Furthermore, the author provides industry based recommendations towards the 
application and drafting of such Oil Major clauses. These analyses will serve as a guide for both 
shipowners and charterers that seek to draft the most suitable Oil Major or so called vetting 
clause for their charter-parties or similar contractual relations. The analyses have further provided 
a guiding light in the vast and complex planes of the process of Oil Major approval, and the 
various legal implications entailed in the procedure.   
Introduction  
The Oil Major approval of tanker vessels is an essential part of the daily commercial transactions 
that are conducted by oil tankers across the globe. Without the Oil Major approval, it is highly 
difficult for the vessels to profitably trade oil, and in cases the approval is lost, it may cause 
issues of liability from the ship-owners part, towards the charterers subject to charter-party. 
Furthermore, the loss of an oil major approval, may amount to detrimental reduction of the oil’s 
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price, in the selling port, therefore, causing damages. The Oil Majors and other lesser oil 
companies have established a unified system that allows them to regulate the quality of the 
vessels and oil that is being traded in the international markets, in order to ensure uniform 
standards and quality among all merchants. The Thesis aims to analyze the approval of tanker 
vessels by the Oil Majors, and the related process and formalities, according to the available case 
law. Further, to establish what are the ship-owner’s liabilities towards charterers in cases the oil 
major approval is denied, or lost in the middle of the voyage. The author proposes three research 
questions as the aim of this research: ‘what is the process of tanker vessel approval by the oil 
majors, and what are the legal effects on the shipowner’ further, ‘what is the legal relationship 
between the charterers, Oil Majors and shipowners.’ Finally, ‘how has the international 
communities’ regulations towards marine environmental preservation influenced the policies of 
the Oil Majors.‘ The research has utilized a variety of sources, primarily focusing on case 
analysis from the English Admiralty Courts, as England is usually the chosen forum for maritime 
disputes, further proceeding with arbitral tribunal judgments, as the parties often decide to 
proceed with arbitration when resolving their disputes. Furthermore, relevant charter-parties and 
various industry recommendations as well as academic writings are analyzed in order to establish 
solid support for the analysis. Nevertheless, relevant conventions and mechanisms with regard to 
oil pollution are mentioned to illustrate the international communities’ actions on a global scale 
to battle oil pollution. It is essential to note that, the topic is highly practical in its’ nature, 
therefore, case law, charter-parties and industry professional standards are used as the main 
sources. 
The first part is aimed at establishing which oil companies are to be considered as Oil Majors, 
subject to relevant Admiralty Court and arbitral tribunal judgments, further, to ascertain their 
influence and effects on international shipping. The second part will address the humanities’ 
response to various oil pollution accidents, which have directly affected the enactment of various 
legal mechanisms to combat oil pollution, and have further affected the policies of Oil Majors 
themselves. The part will further provide slight historical developments of Oil Majors, and how 
their policies towards the vessel approval have significantly changed, due to global accidents and 
political reasons. The following part will focus on the actual practice of the Oil Major approval, 
involving all the necessary elements and procedures within the approval process. It will further 
analyze the legal relationship between the Oil Majors and Ship-owners, as well as, the legal 
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consequences of the approval. Finally, the thesis will conclude with a chapter devoted to charter-
parties. Where the two most common and relevant types of charter-parties with regard to Oil 
Major approval will be analyzed, in order to establish the commercial practice within this sphere. 
Furthermore, the legal relationships between the Oil Majors, Ship-Owners and Charterers will be 
ascertained, taking into account the legal consequences and implications subject to the charter-
party if the Oil Major approval has been lost.  
The doctrinal methodology has been chosen for this particular work, as it will be necessary to 
analyze the existing case law concerning the Oil Majors, in order to determine the practice and 
legal effects entailed in this process. The doctrinal methodology will be used specifically for the 
first, third and fourth part. Additionally, interdisciplinary methodology will be used for the 
second part in order to ascertain the political and economic impact of the Oil Majors and the 
vetting procedures, and its effects on the international shipping.  
1. The Oil Majors 
1.1. The Oil Majors as Defined by Case law 
The ‘Oil Majors’ is a generally common term used to describe the six largest oil companies in the 
world that are dominating the oil market. Their policies and actions influence many different 
industries, especially the shipping industry, due to the fact that oil flow across the globe is mostly 
ensured through the oil tanker trade. This part will address the issue of actual defining of the Oil 
Majors subject to case law, in order to determine which companies legally are considered as 
being the Oil Majors subject to previous court judgments. Furthermore, the Oil Major importance 
on the shipping industry will be ascertained in order to determine their influence on different 
operational, political and economic aspects of the trade. Essentially, the established role played of 
the Oil Majors will assist the author in further chapters when determine the legal relationships 
and consequences resulting out of the Oil Major approvals with regard to charterparties. 
In The Rowan1 case the English High Court of Justice (Commercial Division), mentioned 
different Oil Majors namely; Exxon Mobil, Statoil, Lukoil, BP, and even a Greek Oil Major 
                                                
1 Transpetrol Maritime Services Ltd v SJB (Marine Energy) BV (The Rowan) [2012] EWCA Civ 198. Available on: 
Westlaw UK Database. 
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Motor Oil Hellas, which the court stated to be “less of a ‘major’ than others.”2 All these afore 
mentioned oil companies had conducted the vetting inspections within the SIRE system.  In the 
Falcon Carrier Shipping3 Shell, Conoco Phillips, and Chevron were considered to be part of the 
term ‘Oil Majors’ subject to 1984 Shelltime 4 Charter-party, which included a clause “The vessel 
shall hold at least 3 (three) out of the following: Conoco / Chevron / Exxonmobil / BP Amoco / Shell / 
Statoil.”4  What is vital in this context, is the establishment of what really determines which oil 
companies will be considered as the Oil Majors, there are two possibilities. Within the 
Charterparties there can be an incorporated ‘Oil Major‘ Clause subject to the parties’ discretion, 
which will determine the ship-owners obligation towards which Oil Majors the approval must be 
acquired, however, the Clause could not always be sufficient in determining the actual status of 
an Oil Major, as relevant case law has proven.  
In the Dolphin Tankers v Westport Petroleum5 the Charter-party included an Oil Major Clause 
which included 5 Oil Majors, namely; BP, Shell, Exxon, Chevron and Total, this clause excluded 
the 6th Oil Major ConocoPhilips. The Charter-party further contained a clause with an option to 
cancel the Charter if in consecutive reviews three Oil Majors would have rejected the vessel. The 
rejection was received by three Oil Majors where one of them was ConocoPhilips, the Oil Major 
which was excluded in the Clause contained in the Charter-party, therefore, Charterers canceled 
the Charter-party. The Ship-owners had argued that ConocoPhilips was not part of the Oil Major 
Clause that was incorporated in the Charter-party, therefore, the Charterer’s cancelation was 
unlawful. Finally, the English High Court concluded, that the Charterer’s had rightfully canceled 
the Charter-party subject to the Clause, and that the initial arbitral tribunal had rightfully found 
that in the world there are six Oil Majors. Further, the English High Court affirmed, that it was 
right from the arbitrator’s perspective, to step outside the Charter-party when determining this 
issue: 
“There were six recognised oil majors. The ordinary and natural meaning of the unqualified words 
"oil major" included all six major oil companies. That meaning was supported by the reference in 
the definition of "vetting review" to nomination by the charterer to "an" oil major. There had been 
                                                
2 Ibid para 11. 
3 Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between Falcon Carrier Shipping, Ltd., As 
Owner Of The M/V Falcon Carrier, Claimant ST Shipping And Transport, PTE. LTD., Time Charterer, And 
Glencore, LTD., AS Guarantor, Respondents, Under A Time Charter Party, Date, 2013 WL 5409218. Available on: 
Westlaw International Database. 
4 Ibid 
5 Dolphin tankers v Westport Petrol [2010] EWHC 2617 (Comm). Available on: Westlaw UK Database.  
 
 
 
 
5 
no intention to confine the natural meaning of that expression. The arbitrator had correctly found 
that it would make no commercial sense for the vessel's approval to be limited to a sub-set of oil 
majors and that the vessel's tradability could be assessed by any of them (see paras 36-38 of 
judgment)”.6 
The case has illustrated that, the Oil Major Clause in charter-party may not always fully 
determine the status of Oil Majors, if it will not contain the list of the six main recognized Oil 
Major companies, namely; Shell, Total, Exxon, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhilips.7 The courts 
have recognized, that for commercial purposes, the Oil Major Clause in charter-party may not 
exclude any of the ‘Group of Six‘ Oil Majors. The importance in this, is the way how the Oil 
Major clauses are constructed in the charter-parties and the legal effects to that, however, this will 
be left to discuss in the final part with regard to charter-parties.8 What is essential to note in this 
regard, is that the Oil Major clauses in charter-parties will not have a full legal effect towards the 
liabilities and they will not protect the shipowner in case they are excluding any of the six Oil 
Majors. In actual oil trade, there may be cases when the charterer would seek to receive an 
approval from an Oil Major that is outside the scope of the Oil Major Clause, therefore the 
shipowner would not be protected from liability in such cases, even if the Oil Major has not been 
mentioned in the charter-parties’ Clause. If shipowners seek to avoid such cases, the Clause must 
be construed very carefully, the best solution would be not to name the clause as an ‘Oil Major 
Clause‘ but rather as ‘Vetting Clause‘ and possibly excluding the term ‘Oil Major‘ at all, as it 
would imply positive approval from all six Majors.9 However, it is possible that the list may 
contain additional to the Six Oil Majors, namely, ‘less of a majors‘ as it was in the Rowan case, 
where the Greek company Motor Oil Hellas had been included in the list.10 This illustrates the 
highly complex legal implications placed on the shipowners by the Oil Major Clauses.  
                                                
6 Ibid page 2 
7 Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between Falcon Carrier Shipping, Ltd., As 
Owner Of The M/V Falcon Carrier, Claimant ST Shipping And Transport, PTE. LTD., Time Charterer, And 
Glencore, LTD., AS Guarantor, Respondents, Under A Time Charter Party, Date, 2013 WL 5409218. Available on: 
Westlaw International Database.  
8 See supra note 84 onwards 
9 See supra note 6 
10 Transpetrol Maritime Services Ltd v SJB (Marine Energy) BV (The Rowan) [2012] EWCA Civ 198. Available on: 
Westlaw UK Database. 
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2. The International Communities’ Measures Towards the Environmental 
Preservation of the World’s Oceans and The Effects on the Oil Majors and 
their Policies 
The political rationale behind the Oil Major approval has been shaped by numerous maritime 
casualties, that resulted in devastating damage to the world’s oceans and natural environment. 
Tanker vessel accidents will often result in tremendous ocean pollution, where large amounts of 
crude oil or chemicals are being unleashed in waters, being lethal to oceanic wildlife and its 
inhabitants. This Part will analyze the international communities’ measures towards combating 
oil pollution, and whether the Oil Majors are contributing to the international cause by their 
‘vetting’ or ‘approval‘ policies. The part will have particular reference to various oil pollution 
conventions and regional organizations that have enacted legislation and are combating the 
effects of oil pollution, furthermore, the work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
will be acknowledged to establish their practice on this cause. Essentially, all this part will evolve 
and will be built in the context of the Oil Majors and how their policies have been influenced by 
the international community’s measures towards prevention of oil pollution.  
2.1. The OCIMF  
The Oil Company International Marine Forum (OCIMF) was formed in April 1970 as a response 
to public’s growing concern about marine pollution, particularly by oil after the Torrey Canyon 
accident.11 Following the accident a variety of Oil Pollution initiatives were emerging nationally, 
regionally and internationally, through the OCIMF the oil industry was able to play a greater 
coordinating role in response of these initiatives. The OCIMF was able to provide its professional 
expertise through cooperation with governments and intergovernmental bodies.12 Essentially, 
OCIMF was granted a consultative status at International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1971 
and it still continues to present oil industries views at IMO meetings. The work of OCIMF covers 
tankers, barges, offshore support vessels and also terminals, which are all essential in order to 
ensure the functioning of oil industry. Notably, the OCIMF now is comprised of 112 oil 
companies worldwide, all six Oil Majors are part of the OCIMF, furthermore, the world’s largest 
                                                
11 ‘Introduction,’ OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/organisation/introduction/. Accessed on March 10th, 
2018. 
12 Ibid 
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government owned oil companies are part of the Organization; such as the Abu Dhabi National 
Oil Company, Saudi Arabian Oil Company and others.13 
The OCIMF today is widely recognized as the voice for safety of oil shipping industry, by 
providing its expertise on the safe and environmentally safe transport and handling of 
hydrocarbons. The OCIMF has further been a highly active member at IMO, whereas, they have 
contributed to a wide variety of regulations that have been enacted, with the aim to improve the 
safety of tankers and to ensure the protection of environment.14 OCIMF sends a representative to 
every IMO meeting that is concerned with safety and environmental protection in relation to 
tanker operations. The relationship with IMO is kept strong, whereas, in 2016 the IMO Secretary 
General Kitack Lim had visited OCIMF’s Maritime Safety and Marine Environment divisions.15 
The OCIMF provides reference to IMO’s meetings16 that have been concerned with the maritime 
environmental preservation. The OCIMF has further contributed to discussions with regard to 
tanker safety and the draft EU Directive on Environmental Liability, as well as significantly 
contributed to IMO’s and EU’s discussion on phasing out of single-hull tankers in the past 
years.17  
2.2. SIRE 
The Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE) is a system used as a tanker risk assessment tool 
in order to evaluate charterers, ship operators, terminal operators and government bodies that are 
concerned with ship safety.18 The programme was launched in 1993 and since then has become 
the industry standard tool used by the Oil Majors and other oil companies when determining the 
most suitable vessel to be used in their oil trade transactions.  
The SIRE system is a large database comprised of tanker vessels nominated by ship-owners. The 
inspections are carried out by the SIRE inspectors, which will inspect the vessel and fill in the 
                                                
13 ‘Members‘, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/organisation/members/. Accessed on March 10th, 2018 
14 ‘Annual Report 2017’, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/media/61327/annual-report-2017.pdf. 
Published in 2017. page 7 Accessed on: March 10th, 2018. 
15 Ibid, page 32 
16 ‘IMO‘, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/imo,-iopc-funds-eu/imo.aspx. Accessed on March 15th, 2018. 
17  ‘Annual Report 2017’, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/media/61327/annual-report-2017.pdf. 
Published in 2017. page 7 
18 ‘Ship Inspections Report Programme (SIRE)‘, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/sire/. Accessed on 
March 15th, 2018. 
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Vessel Inspection Questionnaire (VIQ), and then submit it to the uniform SIRE system.19 The 
questionnaire contains overall twelve chapters of information to ascertain the vessel’s 
seaworthiness and security requirements, the chapters are; ‘General Information, Certification 
and Documents, Crew Management, Navigation, Safety Management, Pollution Prevention, 
Structural Condition, Cargo and Ballast Systems, Mooring, Communication, Engine and Steering 
Compartments, General Appearance and Condition.’20 Each one of these questionnaire parts are 
comprised of legislation requirements derived out of international conventions, and other relevant 
standard regulations as enacted by IMO. The VIQ refers particularly21 to; The International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)22, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)23, Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs)24, International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). 25  Such reference to 
international conventions concerned with environmental safety and pollution prevention, affirms 
the author’s assumption, that the SIRE system has been enacted as an another tool to ensure that 
the vessels have complied with the international safety standards, subject to the conventions. 
Furthermore, as the SIRE system has been designed by the OCIMF, it clearly demonstrates that 
the Oil Majors and other oil companies part of the OCIMF, are concerned with environmental 
preservation and they seek to ensure that every single commercial tanker vessel abides the 
international standards. The oil companies are achieving this by refusing to buy oil from any 
vessel that has not been approved under the SIRE system, neither allowing such vessels to enter 
their terminals for any cargo operations. In other words, a vessel that would fail the VIQ, would 
not be able to sell oil to the OCIMF members, until the positive ‘approval‘ would have been 
                                                
19  ‘Sire Factsheet‘, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/media/60083/2015-SIRE-factsheet-final-on-
web.pdf. Accessed on March 15th, 2018.  
20‘Vessel Inspection Questionnaire (VIQ) 2014‘, OCIMF, available on: https://www.ocimf.org/sire/resources.aspx. 
Accessed on March 18th, 2018.  
21 Ibid 
22 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974. Available on: 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-
Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx. Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
23  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Available on: 
http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/mventura/Projecto-Navios-I/IMO.../MARPOL.pdf. Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
24 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs). Available on: 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/COLREG-1972.pdf. Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
25 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978. 
Available on: opac.vimaru.edu.vn/edata/EBook/STCW95.pdf. Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
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received. This is a rational decision by the oil companies, as the questionnaire would indicate the 
security and safety standards on-board the vessel. Whereas, it would place a significant risk on 
the oil company if they were to allow the vessel to enter their terminals, and to conduct cargo 
operations.  
The SIRE system in the Oil Major context is vital due to the reason that it is the system used by 
the Oil Majors and other oil companies when they are determining the most suitable vessel for 
their transactions.  The SIRE reports are often being completed by the inspectors on behalf of the 
Oil Majors, where they physically inspect the vessel and upload the SIRE questionnaire on the 
system, by further deciding whether to approve or not to approve the vessel. The other scenario is 
when a physical inspection is not required, then the Oil Major will review previous SIRE reports. 
The general criteria for a vessel to be acceptable for the Oil Majors it has to contain four criteria, 
namely; there has to be an up-to-date SIRE report, which evidences minimal or no deficiencies to 
the vessels, further, the vessel must have a good safety report, the crew matrix and shore-based 
management systems must be adequate, finally, other ships in the same fleet must have a good 
safety record.26 However, this may depend on case-to-case basis, also each Oil Major has a 
slightly different approach towards the approval procedure.  
2.3. International Communities Response To Oil Pollution with Legal Mechanisms 
Contemporarily, the international community has been highly concerned with oil pollution 
accidents and maritime casualties that have resulted in devastating damage to the oceanic life. 
However, historically it was not the case. The impact of shipping on the marine environment was 
not recognized as early as in 1954, when government of the United Kingdom called a conference, 
in order to introduce measures against the deliberate discharge of oil and oily residues into the 
territorial sea of states.27 At that period, washing of vessel’s tanks and later discharging the 
mixture of oil and water into the sea was a common shipboard operation.28 As a response, the 
international community enacted the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of 
                                                
26 Helen McCormick, ‘Oil Major Vetting and ‘Approvals‘ ‘, standardclub bulletin, published in December 2011. 
Page 1.  Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
27 Sarah Fiona Gahlen, Civil Liability For Accidents at Sea, (Germany: Springer-Verlag  2014) page 8  
28 Ibid 
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Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL),29 which prevented the discharge of oil or other oily 
mixtures within 50 miles from the mainland, and also established some ‘prohibited zones’ that 
were to be particularly protected. Notably, these measures were being enacted at the same period 
when the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea took place in 1954, which 
resulted in conclusion of Four Conventions in 195830; Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zones31, the Convention on the High Seas32, the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas33, and additionally the Optional Protocol 
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes arising out of the Law of the Sea 
Conventions.34 
2.3.1. Torrey Canyon 
Even though, the OILPOL Convention was ratified by many states across the globe, pollution 
control was still of a minor concern at that time for the international community and IMO itself. 
Whereas the world only began to acknowledge the environmental hazards of an increasingly 
industrialized society.35 The international communities perception towards the environmental 
issues drastically changed in 1967, when the Torrey Canyon ran aground off Land’s End36 and 
released 120,000 tons of crude oil in the sea. The accident had raised questions of measures in 
place at that period to prevent oil pollution from ships and also address the deficiencies in the 
system to provide compensation following accidents at sea. As a response to the accident, IMO 
called an Extraordinary session of its Council which drew up an action plan on the technical and 
                                                
29  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, available on: 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/oilpol1954.html. Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
30 Donald R Rothwell, Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, (The United Kingdom: Hart Publishing, 2nd 
edition 2016) page 6  
31  Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Geneva, 29 April 1958. Available on: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXI-1&chapter=21&clang=_en. Accessed on: 
March 18th, 2018. 
32 Convention on the High Seas 1958. Available on: https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf. 
Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
33 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958.. Available on: 
https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_fishing.pdf. Accessed on: March 18th, 2018. 
34  Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Available on: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-5&chapter=21&lang=en 
35  ‘Background‘, IMO, available on: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/environment/pollutionprevention/oilpollution/pages/background.aspx. Accessed 
on: March 21st, 2018.  
36 Elizabeth A Kirk, “Science and the International Regulation of Marine Pollution,” in Routhwell Oude Elferink and 
Scott Stephens: The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, (Oxford University Press, 2015) Page 518 
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legal aspects with regard to Torrey Canyon accident. At that time it was still, however, perceived 
that even though accidental pollution was highly devastating, still the operational pollution was a 
bigger threat.37 The developments of 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage38 (CLC), the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution39 (Intervention Convention), and the 1971 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage40 (Fund 
Convention), were directly influenced by the accident.41  
Therefore, in 1969 the 1954 OILPOL Convention was amended, with a mechanism developed by 
the oil industry called ‘load on top‘, which had double the advantage of recovering oil from the 
water, consequently, reducing pollution. During that period, there was a significant growth in the 
oil tanker trade and also in the size of the vessels that resulted in the international communities’ 
perception that the 1954 OILPOL Convention with all of its amendments are still inadequate to 
counter the grave environmental threats that derive from oil trade.42An international conference 
was convened to adopt a new Convention; MARPOL, which would contain provisions from the 
OILPOL Convention, and provide further provisions to counter the emerging pollution threats. 
The new convention provided provisions for continues monitoring of oily water discharges, and 
further provided governments’ with the obligation to provide shore based reception and treatment 
facilities at ports and terminals. MARPOL further provided provisions regarding Special Areas in 
which more significant discharge standards were applicable, those Special Areas are; Red Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea, as well as the Baltic Sea.43 The Convention, however, did not get wide 
recognition in terms of ratifications at the beginning. The situation changed between 1976 and 
                                                
37  ‘Background‘, IMO, available on: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/environment/pollutionprevention/oilpollution/pages/background.aspx. Accessed 
on: March 21st, 2018. 
38  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) 1969. Available on: 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/civilpol1969.html Accessed on: March 22nd, 2018.  
39 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969. 
Available on: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 970/volume-970-I-14049-English.pdf. Accessed 
on: March 22nd, 2018. 
40 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (FUND). available on: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 1110/volume-1110-I-17146-
English.pdf. Accessed on: March 23rd, 2018. 
41 Elizabeth A Kirk, “Science and the International Regulation of Marine Pollution,” in Routhwell Oude Elferink and 
Scott Stephens: The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, (Oxford University Press, 2015) Page 518 
42  ‘Background‘, IMO, available on: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/environment/pollutionprevention/oilpollution/pages/background.aspx. Accessed 
on: March 21st, 2018. 
43 Ibid 
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1977 when another series of oil pollution accidents took place mainly in or nearby the territories 
of the United States. The most significant one of them was the Argo Merchant accident, which 
caused great public concern and which led to further developments in the global battle against 
ocean pollution. The U.S. immediately resorted to international awareness raising, and took the 
initiative on their hands in order to acquire necessary signatories for MARPOL, and further to 
enact other stringent pollution prevention mechanisms. The U.S. had called the 1978 Conference 
on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention, where there was an additional Protocol adopted to the 
MARPOL, furthermore, in order to increase the ratification process, the Conference agreed to 
excludes parties from Annex II, for a period of up to three years from the date when the 
Convention enters into force.44 
2.3.2. Amoco Cadiz 
The international community received another blow to their pollution prevention efforts in 1978, 
when Amoco Cadiz grounded near the French coast, resulting in the worst oil spill for France 
ever. The oil spill was also one of the most significant ones the world had ever experienced, as 
more than 220,000 tones of crude oil were unleashed in the waters, causing contamination of over 
120 beaches in France, further, resulting in millions of ocean species casualties, essentially, some 
of the species were completely distinct in particular areas.45 Notably, Amoco operated the vessel, 
which is Oil Major BP’s subsidiary company in the U.S., whereas it carried oil for Oil Major 
Shell.  
2.3.3. Exxon Valdez  
In 1989, another oil pollution accident was the driving force to enact further changes in the 
Annex I of the MARPOL, since the adoption of its protocol in 1978. Exxon Valdez was a Very 
Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) operated by Oil Major Exxon, which ran aground on north-eastern 
part of Prince William Sound.46 The accident caused largest crude oil spill in the U.S. waters to 
date. Importantly, it gained a wide outcry in the public, which demanded an immediate 
                                                
44 Ibid 
45  ‘AMOCO CADIZ, France, 1978‘, ITOPF, available on: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/case-studies/case-
study/amoco-cadiz-france-1978/. Accessed on: March 21st, 2018.  
46  ‘Background‘, IMO, available on: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/environment/pollutionprevention/oilpollution/pages/background.aspx. Accessed 
on: March 21st, 2018. 
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government’s reaction.47 The key measure of the Exxon Valdez accident towards the development 
of international oil pollution mechanisms, was the proposal to enact compulsory ‘double hull‘ 
regulation into MARPOL. The amendments entered into force in 1993 and currently, most single 
hull tankers were banned from trading oil internationally since 200548, with some exceptional 
types of tankers ‘category 3‘ since 2010.49 The European Union, with this regard had acted 
unilaterally and banned single hull tankers from its ports since October 21st, 200350, which a 
move widely criticized by IMO, due to its unilateral nature.51 
2.3.4. Erika and Prestige 
The Erika and Prestige accidents were a turning point in the Oil Major approval policies, where 
the Oil Majors no longer were willing to issue ‘blanket pre-approval‘ letters in the form in which 
they previously approved tanker vessels. The perception of the Oil Majors was that their 
reputation had been damaged by those pollution accidents, in connection with pre-approved 
tanker vessels. Therefore, the new policy in practice was implemented by issuing approvals in 
more guarded forms52, often stating that a blanket approval should not be implied from the 
approval letter, and that the vessels acceptability will be reviewed on case-to-case basis when 
accessing the ports or terminals of the particular oil company.53 The Erika accident further led to 
various Regulation and Directive enactment in the EU, concerned with marine pollution and 
safety. The measures within the EU have been classified as Erika I, Erika II and Erika III, so 
                                                
47  John Holusha, ‘Exxon's Public-Relations Problem‘, nytimes, available on: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/21/business/exxon-s-public-relations-problem.html. Accessed on: March 22nd, 
2018. 
48  ‘Revised phase-out schedule for single-hull tankers enters into force‘, IMO, available on: 
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1018&doc_id=4801. Accessed on: March 22nd, 2018.  
49 Ibid 
50  ‘Single-hull oil tankers banned from European ports from 21 October 2003‘, Europa, available on: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-1421_en.htm?locale=en. Published on: October 21st, 2003.  
51  ‘IMO Concern At Unilateral EU Action On Single-Hull Tankers‘, steamship mutual, available on: 
https://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/Articles/SingleHull_IMO_1003.asp. Published in October 
2003.  
52  Eric Chau, ‘Dispute on Oil Major Approval Clause‘, seatransport, available on: 
http://seatransport.org/seaview_doc101/SV105%201404/1059%20Dispute%20on%20Oil%20Major%20Approval%2
0Clause.pdf. Accessed on March 26th, 2018. page 1 
53 Please see further note 49 “Most of the Oil Majors currently operate such a system, where they imply that blanket 
approval should not be perceived.” 
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called ‘Erika Law‘, where on each one of these phases, different legislation was adopted to 
ensure additional safety compliance within the EU MS ports.54 
2.3.5. UNCLOS Regime 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is generally considered to be 
the current framework that creates the regulatory regime with regard to marine pollution. The 
provisions of Part XII consists of commonly accepted customary international law rules that 
contain general obligations towards marine pollution across all maritime areas, and from various 
sources. However, the LOSC does not provide great detail, what it does is rather provides 
framework for jurisdiction and obligations of flag, coastal and port states.55 
Overall, the international communities’ actions towards environmental causes, particularly, oil 
pollution, have been directly influenced by significant maritime accidents, that have lead to grave 
contamination of the world’s oceans. The OCIMF which is a organization comprised of the 
world’s largest oil companies and all Oil Majors, has provided significant assistance in terms of 
expertise towards the environmental preservation mechanism development, both regionally and 
internationally. The Oil Major policies have also been directly influenced by the maritime 
casualties, especially Prestige and Erika, which lead to the policy to no longer issue blanket pre-
approvals.  
3. The Legal Aspects of Tanker Vessel Approval (Vetting) by the Oil Majors 
The tanker vessel approval or so called vetting, is being carried out by the Oil Majors and oil 
companies in order to determine whether the vessel complies with the quality and security 
standards subject to the international norms. The approval procedure is carried out by a ‘vetting 
inspection‘56 appointed by the Oil Majors or oil company when they seek to determine whether 
the vessel is suitable to carry out oil trade on their behalf, or whether, to receive oil from such 
vessels.57 The vetting inspections are carried out by all Oil Majors, and it is an essential part of 
                                                
54 Aleka Manadaraka-Sheppard, Modern Maritime Law, (Routledge, 2nd edition 2007) pages 997; 1003; 1012.  
55 Elizabeth A Kirk, “Science and the International Regulation of Marine Pollution,” in Routhwell Oude Elferink and 
Scott Stephens: The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, (Oxford University Press, 2015) Page 520  
56 See supra notes 18;19;20 
57  Captain Howard N. Snaith, ‘Paris MoU PSC Familiarisation Course (Part 2) April 2011’, available on: 
https://www.intertanko.com/upload/SnaithHaguePart2Vetting.pdf. Accessed on: March 26th, 2018. 
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the daily tanker commercial transactions. Due to the reason that, firstly, the vetting inspections 
serve as another tool to ensure that the ship-owners are complying with the compulsory safety 
requirements that are compulsory under the flag-states and port control authorities, subject to 
international legal norms and instruments. Further, without an Oil Major approval, the vessel will 
not be able to successfully carry out oil trade, as the vessel would not be allowed to enter Oil 
Major terminals for cargo operations, without possessing such approval. This part will focus on 
the legal effect analysis with regard to Oil Major approval of tanker vessels, and the 
consequences arising out of that.  
To begin with, acquiring the Oil Major approval is a vital part for the ship-owning company in 
order to enable its vessels to trade oil in the international markets, and to ensure that the vessel 
could be further chartered. In the case of Astipalaia v Hanjin Shenzen58 the vessel had lost its Oil 
Major approval due to a collision and had to undertake long repair works. Within the process of 
re-acquiring the Oil Major approval again, the vessel did not trade oil, but was converted into a 
‘floating storage tank‘ until the approval was once again acquired.59 This demonstrates that, the 
shipping companies are reluctant to trade oil and conduct voyages, unless they have acquired the 
Oil Major approval. It is vital in the context that, the Oil Major approval is not ‘compulsory‘ 
under any international convention or instrument, however, it is more like a common trade 
practice or custom (it could imply effects of Lex Mercatoria), to which the shipowners will abide 
in order to successfully conduct their transactions and to earn profit. Generally, a trade custom is; 
“a custom of trade, if alleged by either party, is a matter requiring detailed evidence of custom. It must be 
reasonable, certain, consistent with the contract, universally acquiesced in, and not contrary to law.”60 
3.1. The Approval Process 
Oil majors operate a system of vetting and approvals to ensure that the vessels they use, trade or 
buy cargos from are of satisfactory quality. The companies’ pool their inspection reports made 
for the purposes of approvals through a database known as SIRE as discussed previously. The 
pooled reports are visible also for other Oil Majors, and other oil companies, which are members 
                                                
58 Owners of the Astipalaia v Owners and/or Demise Charterers of the Hanjin Shenzhen  [2014] EWHC 210. 
Available on: Westlaw UK Database. 
59 Ibid 
60 Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.  In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between IINO Kaiun Kaisha Ltd., Time-
Chartered Owner Of M/T Stellar Hope Chembulk Trading INC., Charterer Under A Time Charter party Dated 
September 10, 1993, 1996 WL 34449887. Available on: Westlaw International Database. 
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of the OCIMF. The vetting inspections cover the same or similar matters for all oil companies, 
however, there may be additional policies for different Oil Majors. A report is sent to Owners 
who may respond with comments, in case there are deficiencies that may be disputed. When 
Owners provide comments these are incorporated in the SIRE report, which is then available for 
all SIRE members to read. Vetting involves more than simply looking at the SIRE report, but that 
report is a major factor in any decision that leads to an approval. It became clear from the 
evidence that the owners and operators of tankers seek and collect written approvals from oil 
majors and like to have as many as possible, preferably from the top names.61 The owners will 
have to acquire the approval from the Six Oil Majors in case they want to make sure that their 
charter-parties are not compromised, as recent judgments such as the Dolphin Tankers62 has 
demonstrated. Where the charter-parties may be cancelled due to the reason that an approval is 
missing from any of the Oil Majors. However, this would depend on case-to-case basis, and the 
particular trade routes the charterers are undertaking. As the charter-party would be breached 
only in cases when the approval cannot be received from an Oil Major with which the charterer 
seeks to trade with. Primarily, the breach of charter will be determined subject to the Oil Major 
Clause or Vetting clause as incorporated in the charter-party, and will be determined subject to 
the indicated oil companies as the parties would have agreed between themselves.  
The approval process may differ from company to company, however, the current and most 
contemporary practice is to use the OCIMF SIRE system, which is used as an industry-standard 
ship inspection tool. The practice of British Petroleum (BP) is to require the SIRE inspectors to 
report on all vessel or operational deficiencies using the VIQ, and to detail both positive and 
negative comments on the vessel’s operational functioning. Essentially, the vessel that seeks to 
trade for BP, will have to receive a confirmation from BP V&C Superintendent subject to the 
SIRE report. Each SIRE report issued by an inspector, is reviewed by a BP Superintendent before 
it is released to the ship-owner’s managers via the SIRE system. The process provides BP with 
another mechanism to ensure the adherence of safety standards on the vessel. Following a 
successful review by the Superintendent63, the Document of Compliance (DOC) holder will be 
                                                
61 Transpetrol Maritime Services Ltd v SJB (Marine Energy) BV (The Rowan) [2011] EWHC 3374 (Comm). 
Available on: Westlaw UK Database. Paragraph 7. 
62 Dolphin tankers v Westport Petrol [2010] EWHC 2617 (Comm). Available on: Westlaw UK Database.  
63  ‘Vetting and clearance‘, BP, available on: https://www.bp.com/en/global/bp-shipping/vetting-clearance.html. 
Accessed on: March 30th, 2018. 
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advised, which in most of the cases is the ship-owner.64 This advice, however, does not constitute 
a blanket approval of the vessel for BP businesses or other terminals and facilities. Notably, BP 
will require screening of vessels on each occasion as they are tendered to trade with BP, or in 
cases the vessels seeks to call in any BP port or facility.65 This policy approach is the one, which 
has been enacted, by most of the Oil Majors after Erika and Prestige accidents, as a defense for 
the Oil Majors against claims or bad publicity.66 
The view of Exxon is similar to BP, whereas, an approval would not be granted to a vessel, which 
does not have a positive SIRE report. Additionally to the SIRE report, Exxon has enacted Marine 
Safety Criteria, which will be used as an additional tool when approving a vessel in order to 
ensure safety standards. If Exxon has put a vessel on hold, it is highly difficult for the hold to be 
lifted, namely, it is done by company’s senior manager, followed by a thorough scrutiny and 
justification with regard to that particular vessel.67 The reason behind this is obviously with 
regard to the Oil Major policies post Erika and Prestige, where the Oil Majors seek to prevent any 
legal liabilities or bad publicity.  
The approval process and the legal consequences may be more complex than it seems at first 
hand. Prior to the ERICA and PRESTIGE accidents in 1999 and 2002, the Oil Majors when 
inspecting the vessel issued a ‘pre-fixture blanket approval letters’ as well as made the records in 
the SIRE system, this pre-approval was effective for a period from six to twelve months. This 
practice had the effect that the ship-owners were certain that the Oil Major approval was granted 
at the time of inspection, ensuring them with legal certainty that they are complying with the 
relevant oil major clauses in their charter-parties. However, this had placed liability issues on the 
Oil Majors themselves, where in 1999 Total had to pay very significant fines ordered by the 
                                                
64 Anish Wankhede, ‘What ISM Certificates You Require to Start a Shipping Company?’, marineinsight, available 
on: https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-safety/what-ism-certificates-you-require-to-start-a-shipping-company/. 
Published on: July 21st, 2016.  
65 ‘Vetting and clearance‘, BP, available on: https://www.bp.com/en/global/bp-shipping/vetting-clearance.html. 
Accessed on: March 30th, 2018. 
66 See supra note 47 
67‘Meeting with ExxonMobil On Vetting Issues’, intertanko, available on: https://www.intertanko.com/News-
Desk/Weekly-News/Year-2000/No-212000/MEETING-WITH-EXXONMOBIL-ON-VETTING-ISSUES/. Last 
edited: October 3rd, 2011.  
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French High Court, after the company had ‘failed to ensure‘ that the vessel was in a good 
condition.68  
The Oil Majors no longer issue ‘pre-approvals‘ and in some cases it may be difficult to establish 
whether the approval has been actually received. In the Falcon Carrier Shipping69 the court 
concluded that; “once a vessel has concluded a successful SIRE, owner may consider the vessel to be 
approved by the Oil Major conducting the inspection unless and until the charterer can demonstrate that 
the Oil Major subsequently determined that it would not accept the vessel for any purpose without an 
additional SIRE inspection. The fact that an Oil Major will not accept the vessel for a particular voyage to 
an environmentally sensitive location or that it requires some additional documentation should not be 
sufficient to establish a lack of under Oil Major Clause, although the failure of the owner to supply any 
requested information in a reasonable time may lead to a finding that the vessel is not.”70 However, what 
is peculiar in this regard, is that even when there has been an apparently successful SIRE 
inspection, if the Oil Major thereafter indicates that the vessel has been rejected on the basis of a 
SIRE review, charterer would be entitled to give notice to owner that the vessel has no longer 
been approved by that Oil Major,71 which can have further legal consequences on the ship-owner 
and charterer legal relationship, that will be discussed in the final Part.   
3.2. Denial of Approval 
There may be different reasons for the Oil Major decision to deny the approval of a vessel, or to 
disapprove it following an approval. The ship-owner would always like to ensure that the 
approval obligation is fulfilled, in case there is an Oil Major Clause incorporated in the contract. 
Essentially, even if the Oil Majors no longer issue ‘approvals‘ in the form as they used to be 
before Erika and Prestige accidents, the currently issued approvals still have the same 
implications on the Oil Major clauses, regardless, of the ‘approval letters‘ form. Contemporarily, 
it is a common trade practice to issue the approvals through email correspondence. The Oil 
Majors generally are now careful when construing their approvals, where the approval letter may 
                                                
68 Robert Myles, ‘Erika Oil Disaster - France's top Court Upholds Total Conviction‘, digital journal, available on: 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/333666. Published on: September 27th, 2012.  
69 Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between Falcon Carrier Shipping, Ltd., As 
Owner Of The M/V Falcon Carrier, Claimant ST Shipping And Transport, PTE. LTD., Time Charterer, And 
Glencore, LTD., AS Guarantor, Respondents, Under A Time Charter Party, Date, 2013 WL 5409218. Available on: 
Westlaw International Database. Page 8th, paragraph 9.  
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include terms such as; “Please note, however, that this letter does not constitute a blanket approval of 
the vessel for LUKOIL-LITASCO business or for visits to Lukoil terminals. The vessel will be screened 
by us on each occasion it is tended (sic) for Lukoil/Litasco business or intends to visit one of our terminals 
or facilities.”72 Such approval practice by the Oil Majors, therefore, create legal difficulties for the 
shipowners, as the shipowner will not be able to receive an approval prior to visiting a particular 
terminal, or when applying to the Oil Major. In order to resolve such issue for the shipowner, the 
Oil Major Clause must be construed to include a timeframe in which the shipowner can resolve 
the deficiency, in order to prevent instant breach of charter on the shipowners’ part. The Clause 
should include a reasonable period for resolving the deficiency as otherwise the charterer would 
simply terminate the charter and claim damages from the shipowner, such a situation would be 
highly unpractical and would create unfavourable trade practices. Such terms also indicate policy 
to screen the vessel on each occasion when visiting the terminals. Therefore, it may not be clear 
in some occasions as to when the approval has been received. 
The English Court of Appeals has provided some clarification with regard to the complex legal 
implications of the term ‘approved‘, where in The Rowan73 judge Mackie QC noted that; “As I see 
it “approved” for the purpose of the clause means that the approval letters specified must be in place 
throughout the charter. At any time when offered to cargo buyers the vessel must not be in a state which to 
the knowledge of Owners would remove the comfort of the warranted approvals to the potential purchaser 
of cargo. For example there will be a breach of warranty if some event occurs which, to the knowledge of 
Owners, would if known to the issuers of the approval letter, cause it to the withdraw or cancel that 
approval. The fact that the commitment undertaken by the writers of the letters is so limited is, as I see it, 
beside the point.”74 
In the Murphy Oil75 case ConocoPhilips, denied the approval due to the reason that the company 
had enacted a new policy, prohibiting vessels with single hulls into their facilities, consequently, 
the charterers terminated the charter-party. Such a decision by the Oil Majors led to a claim from 
the shipowners, against allegedly unlawful termination of the charter-party, where the shipowner 
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sought to recover $6.442.761 in damages from the charterer. The charterers had contested the 
vetting clause incorporated in the charter-party which read as following; “Owner is to maintain 
Shell, ConocoPhilips, Valero and ChevronTexaco vetting approvals throughout the terms of this Contract. 
Should the Vessel fail to maintain the above vetting approvals, Owners shall have a reasonable amount of 
time, not more than sixty (60) days from the date of the vetting, to correct the deficiency. If the Vessel is 
still unacceptable and the Shell, ConocoPhilips, Valero and ChevronTexaco vetting requirements are still 
not met by Owners, Charterers shall have the right to terminate the Charter.”76 The charterer’s argument 
was that the vetting clause did not specifically refer to the SIRE inspections and that the 
shipowner must comply with other means of approval, in this case the double hull policy as 
enacted by the Oil Majors. The Tribunal concluded that the term ‘vetting’ did refer to SIRE as the 
customary approval mechanism in the oil trade, however, subject to the parties’ intentions when 
concluding the contract, the shipowner had to additionally comply with the double hull policy.77 
Therefore, the shipowners claim against the charterer was dismissed and court held that the 
charter-party was lawfully cancelled. However, the charterer had to pay to the shipowner off-hire 
and other related costs in the amount of $1.325.445, as the charterer had unlawfully placed the 
vessel on off-hire, before cancelling the contract.78 
4. The Legal Aspects of Charter-Parties in Relation to Oil Major Approval of 
Tanker Vessels 
Charter-parties are type of contracts used particularly in international shipping for the use or hire 
of the vessel. The charter-parties are used for various purposes subject to the charterer’s 
intentions. The charter-parties may be used in order for the charterer to carry cargo on their own 
behalf, or to sub-charter the vessel, as well as to employ the vessel as a general ship.79 The 
charter-parties generally differ from traditional bill of lading contracts, in two regards. Firstly, 
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charter-parties are not subject to mandatory application of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules,80 
secondly, they are not subject to the statutory assignment contained in the Convention on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea 1992.81  
Charter-party is a contract concluded for the use of the vessel, as opposed to the bill of lading, 
which is classified as contract for the carriage of goods.82 There generally exist three forms of 
charter-parties, namely, voyage charter-parties, time charter-parties and bareboat charter-parties. 
Subject to the author’s aim, the voyage and time charter-parties will be analyzed, as bareboat 
charter-parties are irrelevant83 within the Oil Major approval context. This part will begin with an 
slight introduction to the two relevant types of charter-parties and their trade purposes. The part 
will further proceed with the analysis of particular Oil Major or so called vetting clauses in order 
ascertain the various legal obligations and relationships between the charterer and shipowner. 
Finally, the legal implications arising out of the Clauses subject to the charter-parties will be 
analyzed in order to illustrate various claims that can consequently arise out of the failure to 
retain or acquire an Oil Major approval.  
4.1. Voyage Charter-parties 
Under a voyage charter the vessel is lend out to the charterer for a specific voyage, namely, the 
charter-party will mention specific ports until which the charter-party will be in force. The parties 
to a voyage charter-party are the Carrier, which undertakes the transportation, most commonly 
referred as the Owner or Ship-owner, however, not necessary the registered owner of the vessel. 
They may be also referred to as the chartered owners or disponent owners, as in some cases they 
may have chartered or leased the vessel. The second party to a voyage charter-party is the 
Charterer, which will have the duty to provide cargo for the voyage. The cargo provided by the 
                                                
80  The Hague-Visby Rules - The Hague Rules as Amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968. Available on: 
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charterer is not necessarily his own, the charterer may even be neither the exporter, nor the 
importer of the cargo, however, in most cases charterer will be one of them.84    
The ship-owner will be paid ‘freight‘, which will cover the costs, including fuel and crew, as well 
as its profit. Essentially, ‘laytime‘, will also be provided for the loading and discharging 
operations, if the operations exceed the permitted laytime, the shipowner will be compensated by 
‘demurrage‘ at the rate set down in the charter.85 In this regard, it will be the charterer’s 
obligation to load and unload the vessel within the said laytime period, otherwise claims for 
demurrage will arise, and the charterer may be under obligation to refund the demurrage costs as 
set out in the voyage charter-party. There may also be issues during the voyage with regard to the 
loading or unloading port, in cases the vessel has suddenly lost the Oil Major Approval, 
consequently, the operations may be compromised, possibly exceeding the laytime as set out in 
the charter-party.86 The issue arises at this very moment, the question is, who will be liable for 
the demurrage payments, and whether the shipowner can claim any costs from the charterer, in 
case the approval has been lost in a voyage charter. On the other hand, the charterer is highly 
affected in this situation as well, as the cargo seller or buyer is awaiting for the cargo operations 
to begin, however, it is not possible due to the Oil Major refusal.  
In The Rowan87 case, the vessel was chartered on a voyage charter-party for the carriage of fuel 
and/or vacuum gas oil from, from one to two safe ports in the Black Sea (with charterer’s option 
to discharge at Antwerp) to amongst other, one to two safe ports in the U.S. Gulf. During the 
voyage events occurred that raised claims for demurrage and port costs. Further, there was no 
formal/written ‘charter-party‘ concluded between the parties, however, the parties agreed that the 
terms contained are found in emails that were exchanged. The agreement had an Oil Major 
Clause incorporated which read; ‘TBOOK WOG VSL IS APPROVED BY: 
BP/LITASCO/STATOIL-EXXON VIA SIRE.’ Which translates into “To best of Owner's 
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Chapter I, page 1;2.  
85 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law, (Routledge, 6th edition, 2015) Page 188 
86 See supra notes 137;138 
87 Transpetrol Maritime Services Ltd v SJB (Marine Energy) BV (The Rowan) [2012] EWCA Civ 198. Available on: 
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knowledge, without Owner's guarantee, vessel is approved by the oil companies [there identified, via the 
SIRE database]”.88 
The issue in this case arose due to the owner’s guarantee to have the vessel approved by named 
oil companies, and the standard Vitol terms, specifically, Clause 18. The court found that “the 
force of ‘TBOOK’ (in a voyage charter at any rate) must be first, that the owner has, to the best of his 
knowledge, at the date of the charter, procured approvals from the named oil companies and secondly that, 
at the date of the charter, he knows of no facts which would cause the vessel to lose the approval of those 
oil companies in the course of the duration of the charter.”89 Essentially, the judge found that this 
clause should be treated as a ‘warranty‘ in relation to the documentation of the ‘Oil Major 
Approval‘, and not as a warranty of the underlying condition of the vessel. In this particular case 
the ship-owner had acquired all the documentation that led them to believe that the approval was 
received after receiving initial ‘approval‘ from Shell, and after an agreement to sell the cargo to 
Shell. However, later Shell refused to buy the cargo from Charterers, due to the reason that the 
vessel had issues with sea-chest valve, an issue found by classification survey conducted in 
Antwerp. What is vital in this regard, is that Shell when conducting their ‘approval survey‘ did 
not comment anything regarding the sea-chest valve in the SIRE system, and the approval was 
seen as positive.90  
This issue has illustrated, that even though the Oil Major approval was lost, and the Charterer’s 
sought to claim damages from the ship-owner in the amount of $3.247.000. The ship-owners had 
complied with their obligations under the constructed Oil Major Clause, as they fulfilled the 
‘TBOOK’ obligation with regard to the warranty of documentation, not the warranty of the 
underlying condition of the vessel, as the judge rightly pointed out and allowed the ship-owners 
appeal against the charterers.91 Furthermore, the judge was persuaded by the ship-owner’s 
arguments that “that warranties as to ‘approval’ letters should be treated in the same way as warranties 
about Class. It is well settled that a warranty that a vessel is in Class is not a warranty that she is rightly in 
Class,”92 the judge continued; “it is probably not even a warranty that an owner does not know anything 
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that would cause a vessel to lose her Class or have a recommendation imposed on her.”93  This has the 
same implications as the ‘to the best of Owner’s knowledge’ as the owner’s were certain to the 
best of their knowledge that the approval has been received, by having the relevant 
‘documentation‘ in place. 
The afore analysis have demonstrated the complex situation of the Oil Major approval which may 
lead in certain cases to uncertainties as to whether the Oil Major approval was in place at the time 
when the issue occurred. What is particularly essential in The Rowan case is that, the judges 
found that the warranty of the approval lies in the documentation that the approval has been 
received, and not the actual underlying condition of the vessel, however, clearly they are inter-
linked, as without the vessels underlying condition, the approval would not be received subject to 
an inspection. In this case the charterer’s claims against ship-owner were denied, by confirming 
that the necessary documentation proving the approvals were in place, subject to the agreed 
charter-party terms.  
4.2. Time Charter-parties 
A time charter-party in contrast to a voyage charter-party is defined not by a geographical 
voyage, but rather by a certain period until which the vessel will be at the charterer’s disposal.94 
The set period for time charter-party varies, and it can be generally from six months up to 5 years 
or even longer, subject to the parties’ intentions. The essential difference within the Oil Major 
context is that in time charter-parties ‘hire‘ is being paid, rather than ‘freight‘. Whereas, it will 
directly influence the shipowner in cases the charterer will have lost time owing to shipowners’ 
fault. The running of a time charter-party can be interrupted by an ‘off-hire‘ clause, which will 
temporarily cease the running of hire, therefore, the shipowner will be deprived of its’ 
remuneration for lending out the vessel to a charterer. Failure to acquire an Oil Major approval, 
can directly influence the charterer in terms of the availability to use the tanker vessel for its’ 
intended purposes, namely; to trade oil. Therefore, it may be so that the off-hire clause is 
triggered by the charterer due to the reason that the approval is not in place.95  
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4.3. INTERTANKO on the Oil Major Clauses in Charter-parties 
The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) generally suggest 
to the ship-owners to refrain from the incorporation of Oil Major Clauses in their charter-parties. 
The primary reason for that is that the Oil Major Clauses are highly unfavourable for the ship-
owners due to the practical issues entailed in the approval process. The issue is that today there is 
rarely a formal acceptance or rejection of the vessel by the Oil Majors, therefore, a requirement to 
maintain an Oil Major ‘approvals‘ is highly problematic for the ship-owner, and has led to some 
high-profile litigation. The recommendation of INTERTANKO is that the ship-owner will only 
realistically warrant that the vessel is ‘not unacceptable‘,96 but will not warrant that the ‘the 
vessel will have certain Oil Major approvals during the period of the charter-party.‘  
“a) Owners warrant [emphasis added] that at the time of delivery:   
(i) the Vessel will have a SIRE report available through the OCIMF system which has 
been issued within the last 6 months. 
(ii)  the Vessel is not unacceptable to [emphasis added] [insert 
companies]                                               
(b) If, during the currency of the charter, the Vessel is found to be unacceptable following a 
vetting inspection performed under the SIRE system, Owners will take corrective action 
and will promptly report such actions to the inspecting company concerned and the 
Charterers will be informed. [emphasis added] If required Owners will have the Vessel 
inspected again as soon as reasonably practicable. Owners, however, shall not have any 
obligation to make any changes to the Vessel’s design. 
 (c) If the Vessel is found to be unacceptable following a vetting inspection performed under the 
SIRE system by any of the abovementioned companies, that shall not of itself entitle the 
Charterers to put the Vessel off-hire or to claim damages.  However, should the Vessel be 
found unacceptable on 3 consecutive vetting inspections by any of the abovementioned 
companies, the Charterers shall have the option to cancel the charter with immediate effect 
within 7 days of the result of the third inspection becoming known. [emphasis added] If, at that 
time, the Vessel is committed for a voyage such cancellation will take effect from the completion 
of discharge.”97 
Such clause provides the ship-owner to take a corrective action in cases the vessel is unacceptable 
to Oil Majors, it further sets out the ship-owners obligations towards the charterer if the identified 
defects cannot be corrected. Nevertheless, the clause provides an eventual express right for the 
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charterer to cancel the fixture. The approach provided by INTERTANKO is balanced and 
practical, which would be useful for both ship-owners and charterers. Essentially, the clause 
provides a realistic and practical approach towards the Oil Major ‘approvals‘, which is objective 
for the most contemporary shipping industries practice. The clause ensures that the ship-owners 
will follow their reasonable obligations towards the ‘approval‘, and ensure that the charterer’s 
rights are not violated.   
4.4. INTERTANKO’s Advice to Ship-owners on Oil Major Clauses 
INTERTANKO further provides advice to the ship-owners with regard to the incorporation of Oil 
Major clauses in the charter-parties. It is essential for the ship-owner to not mention anything in 
the Oil Major clause that is not certain, or anything that is legally impossible to comply with. 
Further, the ship-owners should avoid words that make compliance a ‘condition‘ or amount to a 
guarantee. A provision containing a requirement for compliance with future approval 
acquirement should be termed as to ‘owner will provide due diligence.‘ If the vessel is a new-
building, a liberal allowance of time to provide any approvals should be granted. Further, in case 
of time charter-parties, the vessel should remain on-hire when it is being inspected, and the costs 
should be covered by the charterer. Additionally, a clause that would provide a vetting failure to 
place the vessel off-hire should be avoided.  The ship-owner should avoid a provision specifying 
a hire reduction in case the vessel would fail the vetting inspection; charterer’s remedies would 
still remain, and would be those available under the general maritime law of the jurisdiction 
specified in the charter-party. If the owner must include a description of the monetary 
consequences of a vetting failure, the monetary consequences should be limited, if possible, to 
the loss of time and additional expenses incurred by the charterer.98  
4.5. BIMCO’s Advice to Ship-owners on Oil Major Clauses 
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)99 is the largest maritime trade group in 
the world, representing over half of global tonnage internationally. BIMCO was the first 
organization in the world, which in 1913 produced the first draft standard charter-party 
agreement. BIMCO enjoys non-governmental organizations (NGO) status, and it works closely 
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with International Maritime Organization (IMO), also with government agencies with regard to 
different maritime matters.100 Notably, before becoming a BIMCO member, the company is 
being screened by the Membership Department on various aspects such as; environmental record, 
operating and safety procedures, as well as their financial management. Therefore, all of its’ 
members has certain credibility and prestige conferred on them on an international scale, with 
regard to compliance with such key aspects.101 
BIMCO currently produces a wide variety of standard charter-party agreements, which are used 
by ship-owners and charterers worldwide. The standard charter-party agreements will include 
common standardized clauses that will be further up to the parties’ discretion to negotiate on, and 
possibly exclude or include additional clauses. BIMCO perceives the Oil Major Clauses as a 
highly challenging issue, and generally, BIMCO do not recommend the use of such clauses. The 
issue as perceived by BIMCO is that such clauses place the ship-owners in very difficult position 
in terms of compliance. Additionally, the complexities of vetting ‘approvals’ as discussed 
previously, make it highly difficult to develop a workable vetting clause.102 BIMCO generally do 
not recommend, nor offer vetting clauses, and the only ‘workable’ vetting clause is included in 
their BIMCHEMTIME103 time-charter, designed for chemical tanker use. The vetting clause 
provided by BIMCO is split into eight parts, and additional three sub-clauses. Each part will be 
analyzed accordingly in order to ascertain the rationale and legal implications behind each one of 
those sub-clauses. Furthermore, the analysis will allow the author to establish the most practical 
Oil Major Vetting Clauses, nevertheless, to distinguish between the obligations of the ship-owner 
and charterer within the ‘approval‘ process.  
The part a) of the BIMCHEMTIME time charter states that; “Owners shall, with the co-operation of 
the Charterers, arrange to have the Vessel inspected under the CDI and SIRE Vessel Inspection Programs 
and by the major Oil and Chemical companies as required.”104 The rationale behind this part is to 
establish the commercial nature of the charterer’s co-operation with the ship-owners and to assist 
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in the process of obtaining positive inspections from the Oil Majors. The term ‘cooperation‘ is 
meant to stipulate the active participation of the charterers in the process.105 The sub-clause i) 
provides two options, if the charter-party will be concluded for a short period it could include; 
“Owners warrant that on the day of delivery the Vessel has been vetted and is acceptable to”106, however, 
if the charter-party is concluded for a long time period, then such sub-clause will simply be 
impossible to comply with from the ship-owners part, as it is beyond the ship-owners control to 
predict the enactment of new regulations from the Oil Majors. Therefore, in long term charter-
parties, BIMCO recommends the use of a sub-clause that turns the warranty into a obligation to 
exercise due diligence “Owners shall exercise due diligence to maintain such acceptances throughout 
the currency of this Charter Party.”107 Further, the term ‘is acceptable to‘ has been used instead of 
more common term ‘shall be accepted’, in order to prevent the provision turning into a condition. 
Generally, it is advised for the shipowners to refrain from subscribing to vetting clauses that 
imply strict conditions or warranties as to their fulfilment. Such provision also distinguishes 
between the two processes of vetting and acceptance; vetting always precedes acceptance.108 
Whereas, vetting does not always result in acceptance, therefore, such clauses should include 
periods when the shipowner can fix any deficiencies, in order to prevent instant breach of the 
charter-party. In practice, such periods are included within the clause, as it is a rational choice of 
both parties.109  
The second sub-clause ii) “Owners declare that the Vessel has been vetted and is, to the best of their 
knowledge, acceptable on a case-by-case basis by, Owners shall exercise due diligence to maintain such 
acceptances throughout the currency of this Charter Party.” This Sub-clause is similar to i) whereas it 
distinguishes between the process of vetting and acceptance. Furthermore, it illustrates situations 
where specific acceptance of a vessel has not been issued by the oil company following an 
inspection or vetting, but where the owner believes that if they were to seek a formal acceptance 
for a voyage during the charter-party period, it would be given without any further need to 
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inspect or vet the vessel.110 Such terms also reflect the policies of some Oil Majors that no longer 
issue ‘blanket pre-approvals‘ but rather advise the ship-owners that ‘the vessel will not need 
inspections for period of six or twelve months‘. This, however, does not imply positive 
acceptance as discussed in the IV part111, it rather provides an assumption that the vessel has met 
the required standards of the Oil Major, and should the vessel be presented to that Major by 
charterer, it should be accepted.112 However, not necessarily, as currently the Oil Majors would 
still screen the vessel before it enters its’ terminals on case-to-case basis. This should not 
compromise the approval itself, as if it is in place, the Oil Major usually will not require to have 
another inspection in the period between six to twelve months. The screening formality would 
rather check whether the vessel has the approval, and whether it fulfills the companies’ security 
measures.113  
The iii) sub-clause is developed specifically to cover the cases of newbuildings and vessels that 
are currently entering new trades; “Owners shall exercise due diligence to obtain and thereafter 
maintain, throughout the currency of this Charter Party, acceptance of the Vessel by”.114 The rationale 
behind this part is primarily the common practice of newbuildings. The fact is that it will not be 
possible to acquire an approval for a newbuilding before the vessel is delivered and its’ cargo 
discharging operations successfully pass the inspection. If acceptance would be made a strict 
obligation or warranty in this case, then the shipowner would immediately breach the charter-
party when the newbuilding would be delivered into the time charter-party. The obligation, 
therefore, is converted into one to exercise ‘due diligence‘, such approach is similar to the one 
enacted by INTERTANKO, giving liberal time allowance for the newbuildings to acquire such 
approvals.115  
Part b) deals with the responsibility for the allocation of costs with regard to the Oil Major 
approval, under this part, the obligation to arrange and cover the costs of the inspection will be on 
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the owner. Unless, the charterer seeks to acquire approvals from different oil companies, outside 
the charter-party; “Inspections by above named companies (including CDI and SIRE Inspections) to 
maintain or obtain acceptances shall be arranged by Owners and costs for such inspections shall be for 
Owners’ account. If inspections by companies not named above are required by Charterers, all costs for 
such inspections shall be for Charterers’ account.”116 See part c in Annex II. 
Part d) expresses further provisions on newbuildings, which are directly related with the part a) 
sub-clause iii), where the owner will not be in breach of the charter-party by delivering a vessel 
without acceptances and CDI/SIRE inspection, as this provision rightly acknowledges that the 
inspection cannot be undertaken until the vessel has conducted its’ first cargo operations. 
However, when the vessel has reached her first port of discharge, then the owners must act with 
hastily manner, to acquire the relevant acceptances and arrange CDI/SIRE inspection; “If the 
Vessel, on the day of delivery, is a newbuilding without any major approvals or Inspections, then the 
Charterers shall allow Owners reasonable time to arrange for the vetting and Inspection of the Vessel.”117 
Part e) reflects the provisions as set out in the preamble of the Sub-clause a) with regard to the 
co-operation between shipowner and charterer to have the vessel vetted; “Charterers shall assist 
Owners to get relevant oil and chemical companies to vet the Vessel. If any of the major Oil and/or 
Chemical companies, including those named above, refuse to inspect the Vessel because they have no 
commercial interest in the Vessel or an inspector is not available, then the Owners shall not be held liable 
and sub-clause (g) shall not apply.”118 The term ‘shall assist owners‘ places an obligation on the 
charterers to actively participate in the approval acquiring process.119 This does not seem, 
however, to be practical for the charterer’s, as in some cases they may not be experienced in such 
practices, or simply would not have the means available to be involved in such process. The 
second part of this sub-clause, specifies and protects the ship-owners against situations if the 
approval has been declined on the lack ‘commercial interests‘ or ‘if inspector is not available‘, 
preventing the ability of charterer to reduce hire, by making the owner liable for situations 
beyond their control. 
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Part f) stipulates that the vessel shall remain on-hire during the period of inspection, and that the 
charterer may place the vessel off-hire only in situations the vessel has been expressly failed the 
inspection; “(f) The Vessel shall remain on-hire for the purpose of carrying out Inspections described in 
sub-clauses (a) and (b) above. If the Vessel fails to be accepted following any such Inspections or achieves 
a CDI score below an agreed minimum score of: ____ % (calculated as the average of the Statutory, 
Recommended and Desirable Sections), then the cost for re-inspection will be for the Owners’ account 
and the Vessel shall be off-hire for any time lost in having her re-inspected.”120 This Sub-clause 
provided by BIMCO is more focused on chemical tanker inspections, however, it would have the 
same effect on oil tanker inspections within the SIRE system. The common approach, however, 
in the Oil Major approval with this regard is that, the charterer would have the right to place the 
vessel off-hire after the owner has failed to acquire approval on ‘three consecutive vetting 
inspections by named Oil Majors‘121 This seems to be a commercially reasonable approach, 
giving equal rights on both the owner and charterer, further, providing protection and ensuring 
compliance from both sides.  
Part g)122 deals with the sanctions that are placed on the vessel for the owners’ failure to obtain or 
retain acceptances, and also deals with the consequences of such failure, even if the due diligence 
was exercised. The sanctions are limited, however, only to companies named in sub-clauses (a)(i) 
through (iii) and not to unnamed companies.123 However, according to the relevant case law, 
namely, the Dolphin Tankers124, the English High Court established, that it is allowed to step 
outside the charter-party, with regard to determining the Six Oil Majors. Furthermore, if approval 
has not been acquired by one of them, the ship-owner may be at breach of the charter-party if the 
approval was essential for the charterer, even if the company has not been named in the charter-
party.125 The clause further contains a provision for the parties to agree to a daily reduction of 
hire, for each non-acceptance, until acceptance is achieved. The owners are obliged to inform the 
charterers by a written notice when the vessel has been prepared and is eligible to the relevant 
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companies for re-vetting. If the vessel is not re-vetted by the relevant companies within 30 days 
of receiving owner’s notice, the reduction of hire must cease to exist.126 This provision provides a 
defense for the ship-owner, with regard to the Oil Major lack of commercial interest in the vessel, 
or if the inspectors are unavailable at that period, the Part e) will ensure that in such cases the Part 
g) will not be applicable.127 Part g) further addresses the charterer’s possibility to cancel the 
charter-party, in cases the vessel is not able to obtain the acceptances subject to sub-clause a), the 
charterer’s may notify the owner that owners, that unless the situation has not been rectified 
within ninety days, the charterers shall have the right to cancel this charter-party.  The charterer’s 
right to cancel shall be exercised by giving prior notice to the ship-owner, within three working 
days after the expiry of the ninety-day rectification period.128 Such sub-clause has been used to 
ensure that the owners are not caught in situations where it is not possible to retain the acceptance 
or where owners would prefer for economic reasons not to regain the acceptance. The charterers 
on the other hand, have a right to cancel the charter-party in such situations, if the acceptance 
cannot be acquired within the ninety-day period.129  
The final part h) deals with the shipowner’s obligations in cases when the vessel has been 
damaged in an accident, and when the shipowner seeks to regain the vessel’s previous working 
condition as before the accident. The Sub-clause sets out that, the off-hire period after the vessel 
has been damaged, shall not be part of the g) Sub-clause’s thirty and ninety day periods in order 
to restore the vessel’s lost acceptances after the incident.130 What is essential in this regard, is that 
the shipowners must immediately inform the charterers that the accident has occurred, and that 
there could be some possible implications on the Oil Major approvals. If the ship-owners will 
choose not to inform the charterers, it may amount to ‘deliberate misrepresentation‘ and the 
protection from clauses as such, may cease to exist. Further, it may enable the charterer to bring 
                                                
126  ‘BIMCHEMTIVE 2005‘, BIMCO, available on: https://www.bimco.org/contracts-and-clauses/bimco-
contracts/bimchemtime-2005 - Clause 9 (BIMCO Vetting and Inspection Clause for Chemical Tankers). Accessed 
on April 1st. 2018. 
127 See supra note 118 
128  ‘BIMCHEMTIVE 2005‘, BIMCO, available on: https://www.bimco.org/contracts-and-clauses/bimco-
contracts/bimchemtime-2005 - Clause 9 (BIMCO Vetting and Inspection Clause for Chemical Tankers). Accessed 
on April 1st. 2018. 
129 Ibid 
130 Ibid 
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claims for commercial and even consequential damages that have consequently occurred, as in 
the Team Tankers case.131 
4.6. Consequential Claims arising out of Failure to Retain an Oil Major Approval 
Generally, the breach of an Oil Major or Vetting Clause may lead to consequential breaches 
subject to other Clauses incorporated in the charter-parties. The most common of such breaches 
are the laytime and or demurrage Clauses in voyage charter-parties. Whereas, in time charter-
parties in case the charterer would have lost time, it could invoke the off-hire Clause. This sub-
part will address the issue of claims arising both in voyage charter-parties and time charter-
parties.  
4.6.1. Owner’s Misrepresentation and Charterer’s Claims for Subsequent Damages 
As The Rowan132 case has illustrated, the owner’s obligations in receiving the Oil Major 
approval, lies in the obtaining of relevant documentation that confirms the fact that the approval 
has been received.133 The Clause usually is incorporated in charter-parties with the term ‘To the 
best of Owner’s knowledge‘ this term has an essential effect on the owner’s liabilities in case a 
dispute arises. In the Team Tankers134 an issue arose after the vessel collided in Korea, 
consequently repairs had to be carried out. The owner had informed the Oil Majors of the 
problems, after the ‘class survey’ was carried out, pointing out two deficiencies to be dealt with. 
The owner, however did not inform the charterers that this issue occurred, and claimed that the 
vessel would arrive at the contracted date in the port of unloading. At the port of unloading, 
ConocoPhilips advised charterers, that the vessel has been refused by its vetting group, and that 
they reject to buy the contracted cargo.135  
The charterer’s immediately began arbitration proceedings against the ship-owner for ‘deliberate 
misrepresentation‘ and claimed the amount of $1.541.410 for commercial losses. The tribunal 
                                                
131 See supra note 134 
132 Transpetrol Maritime Services Ltd v SJB (Marine Energy) BV (The Rowan) [2012] EWCA Civ 198. Available 
on: Westlaw UK Database. 
133 See supra note 31 (the Rowan judgment para 8) 
134 Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between Team Tankers A/S As Claimant 
And Disponent Owner Noble Americas CORP. As Respondent And Charterer Of The Team Jupiter Under An 
ASBATANKVOY Form Charter Party Incorporating Noble Liquichem Terms 2002 Dated June, 2012 WL 4341824. 
Available on: Westlaw International Database.  
135 Ibid 
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found that the owner had indeed deliberately misrepresented the charterer, and had breached its 
obligations under the charter-party. Furthermore, the misrepresentation and concealing of facts on 
the owner’s part, gave a legal right to the charterer which otherwise would not be there, due to 
the reason that the ‘laydays‘ were not exceeded. Essentially, the deliberate misrepresentation 
allowed the charterer’s to claim damages for ‘future contracts’ and prevented the ship-owners to 
invoke usual defense under English Law, namely, the Hadley v Baxendale136 case which usually 
would not allow parties to claim any subsequent damages, subject to the two limbs, unless the 
facts of subsequent ‘special circumstances‘ were previously communicated.  
The above analysis is a great illustration for the complexities that may arise in the disputes 
between ship-owner and charterer. The deliberate misrepresentation on the owner’s part, led the 
tribunal to establish that the ship-owner had breached its obligations under the charter-party. Had 
the ship-owner previously informed the charterer that the collision occurred, and that there could 
be possible implications on the vetting procedures, the tribunal would have come to a different 
conclusion, and possibly the ship-owner would have succeeded on its claim for demurrage. 
Rather than be left to pay significant amount of commercial damages to the charterer. 
4.6.2. Claims of Demurrage in Voyage Charter-parties 
The secondary payment obligation after freight in voyage charter-parties arises out of the cargo 
operations, namely, loading and discharging. The performance of a voyage charter-party can be 
divided into four parts; two of them are performed by the shipowner, whereas, the other two by 
the charterer. The first obligation of the shipowner is to proceed with ‘reasonable dispatch‘ on the 
‘approach voyage‘ to the loading port or place as set in the voyage charter-party. The place may 
be either a port or berth located within a port. The second obligation is to proceed with 
‘reasonable dispatch‘ on the ‘approach voyage‘ towards the port or place of discharge. The 
obligations of the charterer, on the other hand, are to nominate in a ‘reasonable time‘ a port or 
                                                
136 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341. Available on: Westlaw UK Database. “Where two parties have made a 
contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach 
of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the 
usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the 
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if 
the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the 
defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they 
would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a *356 breach of 
contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated.” 
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place for cargo operations. Further, to conduct the cargo operations without due delay, if the 
charterer fails to perform either of its’ above obligations, the shipowner may claim damages 
against the charterer.137 Essentially, the nominated port has to be a safe port; “A port will not be 
safe unless, in the relevant period of time, a particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, 
in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good 
navigation and seamanship.”138 The other set of charterer’s obligations is more directly related with 
the set time-frame allowed to conduct cargo operations. The ‘reasonable time‘ is replaced by a set 
period in the voyage charter-party; ‘laytime.‘ Consequently, if loading or discharging operations 
exceed the set time in the laytime Clause139, the charterer will be liable for ‘demurrage‘.140  
The relevance of such clauses in the Oil Major context is vital, as the process to acquire a positive 
approval from an Oil Major to enter their terminals directly affects the time when the cargo 
operations can be initiated. Namely, as currently acceptance to enter an Oil Major terminal is 
granted on case-to-case basis, whereas, blanket pre-approvals are no longer provided. Therefore, 
the lay-time can be compromised in relation to such procedures. Generally, for the shipowner to 
fulfill his obligations with this regard, the SIRE inspections must be in place from the relevant 
Oil Majors and other oil companies depending on how the Oil Major/Vetting Clause has been 
construed. Further, the shipowner has to have all the relevant documentation in place that have 
led to acquiring the approval.141 
4.6.3. Claims of Off-hire in Time Charter-parties 
The off-hire clause contained in time charter-party will allow the charterer to place the vessel off-
hire, at times when the charterer is not able to use the vessel for the intended purposes. When a 
vessel is placed off-hire, the ship-owner is not receiving ‘hire‘ per day, which at the end can 
amount to high profit reduction. The triggering of an off-hire clause can be caused by various 
reasons, such as the seaworthiness of vessel or the loss of Oil Major approval, subject to the 
                                                
137 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law, (Routledge, 6th edition, 2015) page 223  
138  ‘Safe Port and Safe Berth Warranties – Time and Voyage Charters’, steamship mutual, available on: 
https://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/Articles/Safe_Port.asp. Published in June 1999.  
139 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law, (Routledge, 6th edition, 2015) page 223  
140 ‘A previously agreed daily rate of liquidated damages, which replaces the common law liability for detention, 
assessed at the market rate. The laytime and demurrage calculations will cease with the completion of the cargo 
operations.‘ 
141 See supra note 81 
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particular events as indicated in the off-hire clause. Generally, a charterer must establish three 
elements in order to invoke the Clause.  
First of all, the charterer must demonstrate that the shipowner has failed to provide its’ services as 
required subject to the charter-party as required by the charter.142 This element could certainly be 
satisfied if the shipowner has failed to acquire relevant Oil Major approvals subject to the 
relevant Clause, however, it can backfire for the charterer if invoked incorrectly.143 Most 
importantly, the charterer must show that the failure has been caused by one of the events 
mentioned either in the off-hire Clause or in the Oil Major/Vetting Clause, otherwise, the off-hire 
cannot be lawfully invoked.144 Finally, the charterer must indicate how much time was lost as a 
consequence of the inefficiencies. Essentially, the invocation of the off-hire Clause depends 
entirely on its’ construction within the charter-party, and on the particular terms and events, to 
which the parties have agreed to trigger the Clause.  
In cases when the charterer seeks to invoke the off-hire clause subject to shipowner’s failure to 
acquire or maintain an Oil Major approval. The charterer must ensure that those particular events 
are included within the Clause, as otherwise, the charterer would be due to cover all the costs for 
withheld hire, including interest. To deal with such issues, both the shipowners and charterers are 
invited to mutually agree on the terms when negotiating their charter-parties, in order to establish 
clear grounds as to when off-hire can be invoked. The Oil Major/Vetting Clause must also 
include reference to off-hire145, in order to prevent legal uncertainties as to when the off-hire 
clause can be invoked. 
In the case of Wonsild Liquid Carriers v. M/T Dzintari146 the charterers had decided to place the 
vessel off-hire subject to disponent owner’s failure to acquire relevant Oil Major approvals. The 
                                                
142 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law, (Routledge, 6th edition, 2015) page 246  
143 See supra note 75 
144 Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. In The Matter Of The Arbitration Between Keystone D.T., INC., As Owner 
Murphy Oil USA, INC., As Charterer Under An Amended Nype Time Charter Party Dated August 20, 2010 Under a 
July 27, 2007 Shelltime4 Contract For The Charter Of The M/T Delaware TRA, 2015 WL 9450194. Available on: 
Westlaw International Database. “It is well settled that a charterer is required to pay charter hire continuously unless 
there is an applicable express exemption in the charter party. Clause 77 (The Vetting Clause) is silent regarding off-
hire, and specifically provides for a remedy of termination for a violation of the Clause. Accordingly, Murphy had no 
right to stop paying hire based upon Clause 77” 
145 See supra note 90 INTERTANKO Clause  
146 In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Wonsild Liquid Carriers Ltd., As Disponent Owners of the M/T 
Dzintari, Naviera Del Pacifico Sa De CV, As Charterers. [Society of Maritime Arbitrators, New York February 24th, 
2003). Available on: Westlaw International Database.  
 
 
 
 
37 
vetting clause147 included that the shipowner must exercise due-diligence to acquire the Oil Major 
approvals from BP, Mobil, Shell, Chevron, Texaco, Dow and from other companies subject to 
the charterer’s request. The clause further included that in case of non-compliance, the charterer 
can place the vessel off-hire. The disponent owner had informed the charterer that the vessel 
would not be inspected in Houston, as to which the charterer responded by issuing a voyage 
order, to discharge the cargo at different location. The charterers later informed that the vessel 
has been placed off-hire, even when giving the vessel different instructions. The arbitral tribunal 
concluded, that the charterer’s had two options on how to respond to the failure to acquire the 
approvals. The first option was to put the vessel off-hire, the second, to continue to trade the 
vessel without the approval to other companies. The charterers had exercised their second option 
initially, therefore, they unlawfully had placed the vessel off-hire, and were due to pay the hire 
costs to the disponent owner.148 
Conclusion 
All in all, the Oil Major approval of tanker vessels is a highly complex legal issue, whereas the 
author strongly believes that, these analyses have provided significant guidance throughout the 
complexities of this issue. Generally, the tanker vessel approval procedure, so called Oil Major 
approval or vetting, has been strongly influenced by various maritime casualties that have 
resulted in tremendous damage to the world’s oceans. Those maritime casualties have led and 
united the international community against the battle of oceanic pollution. Each one of these 
significant maritime casualties as discussed in Part III have resulted in various regional and 
international initiatives, which have materialized in the adoption of international conventions and 
mechanisms against the humanities attempts to balance its’ commercial energy needs, with the 
preservation of our environment. Those measures, and maritime casualties have, nevertheless 
                                                
147 Ibid M/T Dzintari “Owneers to exercise due diligence throughout the term of the Charter in maintaining 
compliance/approvals with major oil and chemical company vetting standards. All compliance/approvals to be 
arranged at Owners time and expense. Upon delivery, Owners warrant that the Vessel has approvals from BP, Mobil, 
Shell, Chevron, Texaco, Dow and CDI in accordance with those companies' vetting procedures and throughout the 
term of the Charter shall maintain these approvals in accordance with each company's vetting procedure. 
Furthermore, Owners will use best endeavors to obtain major oil/chemical company approvals as requested by 
Charterers. Owners will exercise due diligence to maintain such additional approvals throughout the term of the 
Charter. Should Owners fail in maintaining all the above approvals, then Charterers to have the option of placing the 
Vessel off-hire until such time as the approval(s) are obtained.” 
148 Ibid M/T Dzintari 
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influenced the Oil Major policies, whereas their commercial practice has been changed towards 
the approval procedures. Namely, the blanket pre-approval policy as practiced prior to 2000, was 
abolished following the Erika and Prestige accidents. Currently, the Oil Majors no longer issue 
blanket pre-approval letters, where they seek to determine whether the vessel is ‘acceptable’ on 
case-to-case basis, before allowing it to conduct cargo operations in its’ terminals.  
The author’s analyses have shed light on the complex differentiation issue with regard to terms 
Oil Major and oil company. Namely, subject to English Admiralty Court’s current authority 
Dolphin Tankers, Oil Majors are considered to be the six largest oil companies in the world, 
those are; BP, Shell, Exxon, Total, ConocoPhilips and Chevron. This directly influences the 
construction of Oil Major and Vetting Clauses that are being incorporated within the Charter-
parties.149 If in a charter-party, the clause refers to Oil Majors, then it refers specifically to those 
six oil companies. It is possible, however, that the parties have agreed on terms to incorporate 
additional oil companies within the Clause. Such situation is common, and accepted, whereas, it 
is enshrined in the principle of party autonomy to decide, which oil companies to include within 
the approval clause. What must be essentially noted in this regard is however, that if the 
shipowner has agreed to comply with a Clause that incorporates the term ‘Oil Majors‘, then in 
order to prevent legal implications, the shipowner should acquire approvals from all six Oil 
Majors, in order not to be in breach of the charter-party.150 To prevent such scenarios, the parties 
could opt to refrain from the term ‘Oil Majors‘ and rather, indicate the clause as ‘vetting‘ or 
simply ‘approval‘ Clause. However, if such Clause would still mention mostly the Oil Major 
companies and if the dispute is brought to admiralty court, then it could be interpreted subject to 
the customary commercial practice, as in the afore mentioned case.  
Generally, the failure to acquire or retain an Oil Major approval subject to a charter-party may 
raise various legal implications and claims from both the charterer’s and shipowners. The most 
common of such consequential claims are the demurrage in voyage charter-parties151 and off-hire 
in time charter-parties152. There may also be cases of owner’s misrepresentation, with regard to 
not informing the charterer that the approval has been lost, where the charterer may claim 
damages on such grounds.   
                                                
149 See supra note 6 
150 See supra note 6 
151 See supra note 137  
152 See supra notes 142-148  
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The tanker vessel approval or so-called vetting is being carried out using the SIRE system as 
enacted by OCIMF. Whereas, it has been accepted as industry wide custom and is being used by 
all Oil Majors, and all most significant oil companies in the world. The approval entails a 
physical vetting inspection at first hand, following which a VIQ is completed and uploaded on 
the SIRE database. Following that, the shipowner may add comments on particular criteria which 
it may concern. The oil companies will then screen the vessel through the SIRE system on case-
to-case basis, when tendered for an approval from shipowner or operator. Subject to a positive 
screening, the concerned vessel will be granted with a positive ‘approval‘ to enter the terminal 
and conduct cargo operations.  There may be additional requirements beside the SIRE inspection 
enacted by each Oil Major, however, SIRE inspection is a common practice for all of them. The 
additional requirements may be in the form of additional inspection by companies’ 
superintendent or other aspects that would provide and ensure even greater safety compliance.153 
There may also be situations when the vessel is denied of an approval, and there may be various 
reasons for that. The first reason may be a simple lack of commercial interest in the vessel, where 
the Oil Major do not see a commercial purpose to trade with it. If there is a commercial interest, 
then the vessel’s safety compliance will be screened, and the acceptance or denial will solely 
depend on the vessel’s compliance to the safety requirements as demanded under SIRE subject to 
various legal instruments. The relevant case law has demonstrated that the warranty of an ‘Oil 
Major approval‘ lies in the warranty to have the relevant approval documentation, whereas, it is 
not directly related to the underlying condition of the vessel, however, both are inter-linked, 
therefore, relevant.154 That, however, depends on the particular construction of the oil major or so 
called vetting clause, as the parties can generally agree to the most favourable conditions, subject 
to party autonomy. The legal effects of an positive Oil Major approval are that the shipowner will 
fufill its’ obligations subject to the charter-party, therefore, would not be in breach of the 
contract, preventing charterer to bring successful claims. The legal relationship is between the 
charterer and shipowner subject to the charter-party, whereas, Oil Majors are not part of this 
chain directly, as they approve a vessel on case-to-case basis subject to shipowners or operators 
request.  
                                                
153 See supra notes 60; 62 BP requirements  
154 See supra notes 87;88;89 (warranty of documentation) 
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Most of the tanker trade organizations such as BIMCO and INTERTANKO generally do not 
advice the shipowners to incorporate such Oil Major or vetting clauses in their charter-parties, 
due to the complex legal implications that are entailed in their usage and their unfavourable 
conditions that are placed on the shipowner. However, still very often parties tend to incorporate 
them when concluding their charter-parties, where it is up to the party autonomy to decide on 
their terms of contract at first hand. If such clauses are included, the shipowner must ensure 
compliance with the relevant clause, in order to prevent being liable for damages towards the 
charterer.  
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Annex I 
Statement of Ethics 
I have carefully considered the ethics of conducting (research of various issues that are involved 
in Oil Major vetting, by analysing a variety of legislation, cases and seeking industry 
recommendations through email correspondence) and include here my assessment of ethical 
issues raised and how to approach them. The online aspect of this research, as well as the fact that 
I will be dealing with the sensitive information means that I shall fulfil all necessary ethics 
requirements required by Riga Graduate School of Law as well as those required under Latvian 
Law. Throughout the project, I will be critically reflexive about unanticipated ethical issues 
arising from its sensitive, qualitative and digital nature. 
Much of the data collected will involve interviews with (shipping industry and relevant 
Organizations) professionals, who will not be paid for their participation. Before beginning data 
collection, I will seek consent from the particular Organization by a request, which I will guide 
them through in order to gain their written informed consent. This request will supply my contact 
details; will outline the aims of my research, including my obligation to do no harm; and will 
specify my intended outputs, my intention to share data, and their rights to anonymity, 
confidentiality, and to withdraw from the project at any time. In terms of data retention, I will 
fully anonymise all data on an individual level as well as on an institutional level where 
requested. Only I will have access to the personal information corresponding to collected data, 
which will be securely stored and password protected, and will be held confidentiality. In all 
instances of potentially risky information, I will err on the side of caution. 
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Annex II 
INTERTANO Email Correspondence – Ms. Michele White 
Dear Robert  Thank you for your enquiry.  
Please find below the Vetting Inspection Clause developed by INTERTANKO.  The issue with 
Vetting and oil majors is really that oil majors do not in fact ‘approve’ a vessel. So a c/p 
requirement to maintain approvals is not really appropriate. There is no guaranteed linkage 
between inspection and approval. This is the reasoning behind the wording we use in the model 
clause below. In addition below is some practical guidance we have given to our Members in the 
past to cross check on c/p clauses if they are not using the I-O Model Clause. 
INTERTANKO’s Documentary and Vetting Committees have worked closely together to 
produce a new model clause for vetting inspection in advance of the launch of the new 8th 
Edition of the INTERTANKO book “A Guide to the Vetting Process” to be published in Autumn 
2009.  The clause begins with an express warranty of the vetting inspection position at the time of 
delivery of the vessel. In appropriate cases this express warranty could be qualified by a ‘best 
endeavours’ provision. The clause reflects the practical workings of the SIRE system, as opposed 
to the previous ‘oil major approval’ requirements.  
Today there is rarely a formal acceptance or rejection of the Vessel, so a requirement to maintain 
oil major “approvals” is problematical for an owner, and has led to some high profile litigation.  
The clause therefore provides that an owner will, realistically, only warrant the vessel is ‘not 
unacceptable’. In addition, it is understood that vetting departments will generally only be willing 
to rely on a SIRE inspection report if the inspection took place within the last six months.  The 
clause then sets out the owner’s obligations in the event that a vessel is unacceptable to an oil 
company, giving the owner an opportunity to take corrective action and have the vessel re-
inspected. It deals ultimately with what will happen if the defects identified cannot be corrected, 
with an eventual express right for the charterer to cancel the fixture.  In devising the new clause 
INTERTANKO has tried to take a balanced and practical approach which it hopes will be useful 
for owners and charterers alike.  
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The clause reads as follows:     a) Owners warrant that at the time of delivery:    (i) the Vessel 
will have a SIRE report available through the OCIMF system which has been issued within the 
last 6 months.  (ii)  the Vessel is not unacceptable to [insert companies]                                                   
(b) If, during the currency of the charter, the Vessel is found to be unacceptable following a 
vetting inspection performed under the SIRE system, Owners will take corrective action and will 
promptly report such actions to the inspecting company concerned and the Charterers will be 
informed. If required Owners will have the Vessel inspected again as soon as reasonably 
practicable. Owners, however, shall not have any obligation to make any changes to the Vessel’s 
design.   (c) If the Vessel is found to be unacceptable following a vetting inspection performed 
under the SIRE system by any of the abovementioned companies, that shall not of itself entitle 
the Charterers to put the Vessel off-hire or to claim damages.  However, should the Vessel be 
found unacceptable on 3 consecutive vetting inspections by any of the abovementioned 
companies, the Charterers shall have the option to cancel the charter with immediate effect within 
7 days of the result of the third inspection becoming known. If, at that time, the Vessel is 
committed for a voyage such cancellation will take effect from the completion of discharge. 
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Annex III 
BIMCO Email Correspondence – Mr. Grant Hunter 
Dear Robert 
Thank you for your email. 
Oil major vetting is a challenging issue. BIMCO does not host oil major vetting clauses on our 
website as they often place owners (some of whom may be our members) in a very difficult 
position in terms of compliance – therefore we do not want to be seen to endorse such clauses. 
We have attempted to draft a standard vetting clause for tankers, but the complexities of vetting 
approvals by oil companies make it difficult to develop a workable clause. The closest we have 
come is a clause designed for chemical tankers and found in BIMCO’s BIMCHEMTIME time 
charter. 
Please find below some information on that clause which I hope assists: 
BIMCO BIMCHEMTIME Vetting and Inspection Clause 
Vetting and Inspection Clause for Chemical Carrier Time Charter Parties 
(a) Owners shall, with the co-operation of the Charterers, arrange to have the Vessel inspected 
under the CDI and SIRE Vessel Inspection Programs and by the major Oil and Chemical 
companies as required. 
(i) Owners warrant that on the day of delivery the Vessel has been vetted and is acceptable to: 
 _______________________________________________________________.  
Owners shall exercise due diligence to maintain such acceptances throughout the currency of this 
Charter Party. 
 
(ii) Owners declare that the Vessel has been vetted and is, to the best of their knowledge, 
acceptable on a case-by-case basis by: 
 _______________________________________________________________.  
Owners shall exercise due diligence to maintain such acceptances throughout the currency of this 
Charter Party. 
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(iii) Owners shall exercise due diligence to obtain and thereafter maintain, throughout the 
currency of this Charter Party, acceptance of the Vessel by: 
 _______________________________________________________________. 
 
(b) Inspections by above named companies (including CDI and SIRE Inspections) to maintain or 
obtain acceptances shall be arranged by Owners and costs for such inspections shall be for 
Owners’ account. If inspections by companies not named above are required by Charterers, all 
costs for such inspections shall be for Charterers’ account. 
 
(c) The Owners shall on receipt of an Inspection Report promptly make their comments on such 
Reports available to Charterers and arrange to have them entered into the respective databases. 
 
(d) If the Vessel, on the day of delivery, is a newbuilding without any major approvals or 
Inspections, then the Charterers shall allow Owners reasonable time to arrange for the vetting and 
Inspection of the Vessel. 
 
(e) Charterers shall assist Owners to get relevant oil and chemical companies to vet the Vessel. If 
any of the major Oil and/or Chemical companies, including those named above, refuse to inspect 
the Vessel because they have no commercial interest in the Vessel or an inspector is not 
available, then the Owners shall not be held liable and sub-clause (g) shall not apply. 
 
(f) The Vessel shall remain on-hire for the purpose of carrying out Inspections described in sub-
clauses (a) and (b) above. If the Vessel fails to be accepted following any such Inspections or 
achieves a CDI score below an agreed minimum score of: ____ % (calculated as the average of 
the Statutory, Recommended and Desirable Sections), then the cost for re-inspection will be for 
the Owners’ account and the Vessel shall be off-hire for any time lost in having her re-inspected. 
 
(g) (i) If the Vessel, despite the exercise of due diligence, fails to obtain or retain acceptances by 
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any of the companies listed in sub-clauses (a)(i), (ii) and (iii) above or  the minimum CDI score 
stated in sub-clause (f), then the hire shall be reduced by the amount of ____ per day for each 
company’s non-acceptance and/or while the CDI score remains below the agreed minimum. Each 
reduction in hire, as stated above, shall continue until the corresponding company re-accepts the 
Vessel. If a reduction in hire is caused by a CDI score below the agreed minimum, such reduction 
shall continue until the agreed minimum CDI score is achieved. The Owners shall give the 
Charterers written notice when the Vessel has been prepared for and is eligible to the relevant 
companies for re-vetting. If the Vessel is not re-vetted by the relevant companies within 30 days 
of receiving the Owners’ notice, reduction of hire shall cease. 
(ii) Should the Vessel when re-vetted or re-inspected still not obtain the acceptances required 
under sub-clause (a) or the minimum CDI score required under sub-clause (f), the hire shall be 
reduced or continue at the reduced rate as stated in sub-clause (g)(i) and the Charterers may 
notify the Owners that unless the situation has been rectified within 90 days, the Charterers shall 
have the right to cancel this Charter Party. Such right to cancel shall be exercised by giving 
notice thereof within three (3) working days after the expiry of the above rectification period. The 
cancellation shall take effect as soon as the Vessel is free of existing cargo commitments. If the 
Charterers do not exercise the right to cancel this Charter Party, the provisions of this Clause 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
 
(h) In case the non-acceptances of the Vessel result from the fact that the Vessel, following an 
accident, must perform repairs to re-establish its condition as before the accident, the period of 
time in which the Vessel is off-hire due to such accident and in which the repairs are carried out 
shall not be included in the periods of 30 and 90 days allowed to Owners as per sub-clause (g) to 
restore the Vessel’s acceptances lost for the reason of the accident. 
Kind regards 
Grant Hunter 
Head of Contracts & Clauses 
 
